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This essay has two ambitions. The first is to show that a transnational
comparative perspective can be of value in identifying topics worth studying in
criminology and criminal law as well as an important method of conducting such
studies. The second aim is to use the comparative perspective and method to
explore the topic of corruption, a pervasively important and distinctive
behavioral phenomenon that is of critical importance in both developing and
developed nations. A comparative perspective on corruption provides insight
about the role of this peculiar form of crime in various cultures and stages of
development. Moreover, we also believe that a focus on corruption as a special
category of crime helps to explain the passions and politics that have been
involved in discourse on white-collar crime.
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We begin our tour with a plea for the increasing value of comparative study
as a tool for criminological agenda setting and research. A brief second section
defines corruption as a special subcategory of criminal behavior defined as the
unlawful use of power. A third section then speculates on the relationship
between corruption and features of social and governmental organization. A final
section applies this comparative perspective to some longstanding issues in
criminological discourse. We show that the same mix of condemnation and
imprecision that has frustrated efforts to define white-collar crime produces
ambiguity in the definition of corruption. We also suggest that the core focus of
our criminology of corruption-the use of power as an instrument of crime-also
helps to explain why white-collar crime has evoked concern, particularly among
criminologists on the left. The unifying substantive theme in this analysis is the
view of corruption as the criminal misuse of power.
I. COMPARATIVE CRIMINOLOGY: NECESSITY AND PROMISE

In the early years of the 21st century, there are two important respects in
which citizens of most regions are living on a smaller planet than a generation
ago. First, the impact of problems in one place upon conditions in other places is
more pronounced and faster in the current era than ever before. Whether the
particular event is a bond default in Moscow, avian flu virus in China, political
repression in Burma, or unemployment and low birth rates in France, the swift
impact of many events far from their origins has become a commonplace
observation of those who study globalization in culture, politics, public health,
and economics.
The second aspect of globalization worth mention is the more rapid
contagion of promising innovations in both the private and public sectors of
institutional activity. With frequent travel and multinational business entities,
both the lapsed time before innovations are transferred and the chances of
transfer have increased to an extraordinary degree. So if the first impact of
globalization is a larger susceptibility to problems, the second impact may be the
faster transmission of solutions to problems. There is no indication in current
shrinkage of the globe that the homogenization of commerce and speed of
communication will soon end major differences in society and government, but a
pervasive environment of mutual influence is a broad and important part of
current events in most fields.
Criminology is no exception. International exchanges and organizations are
proliferating in the developed world, including a new European association and
international collaborations among scholars and organizations. Multinational
research projects have included written surveys with common questions and
estimation techniques that were published in the mid-1990s for a variety of
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developed nations', followed by an attempt to measure victimization by survey in
less developed nations. These findings have already been integrated in some
discussions of transnational risks of crime and violence.2 There have also been
more limited international comparisons of criminal case processing and case
outcomes! Such efforts are in their pre-history, with much more work and
greater sophistication to be anticipated in a relatively short time.
Two comments on the promise of comparative criminology here deserve
emphasis. First, the value of comparative work is not simply to document
differences and similarities between countries and systems, for the comparative
perspective is also a valuable tool for analyzing the distinctive character of one's
own domestic practice and policy. The special character of life-threatening
violence in the United States, for example, is nowhere more apparent than in
cross-national comparisons demonstrating that broadly similar rates of nonviolent and even non-lethal violent crime exist among nations, whereas rates of
lethal violence differ markedly.4 So the value of comparison is much greater than
its utility for describing observed variations between states and societies. It is an
essential device for understanding what is distinctive (and problematic) about
domestic arrangements.5
The second point about the promise of a comparative perspective is that the
incentives to conduct comparisons are not evenly distributed throughout
developed nations. Those who live in small countries are more easily convinced
of the necessity of comparative work than those who live in big countries, if only
because national variation is a much more visible element in Switzerland or
Australia than in the United States.6 Yet the value of comparisons in illuminating
domestic problems is just as important for big countries as for small ones. If this
is right, then there may be a special need to promote and illustrate the domestic

1.

See, e.g., J.N.

VAN

KESTEREN,

P. MAYHEW & P. NIEUWBEERTA,

CRIMINAL VICTIMISATION IN

SEVENTEEN INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES:, KEY-FINDINGS FROM THE 2000 INTERNATIONAL CRIME VICTIMS

SURVEY (2000) (issued by the Hague, Ministry of Justice).
2. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA, ch. 3
(Oxford University Press 1997).
3. See, e.g. P.A. Langan & D.P. Farrington, Crime and Justice in the United States and in England and
Wales, 1981-96. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics (1998).
4. ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 2, at ch. 3.
5. J.H. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative Procedure in the United States, 43 AM. J. COMP. L.,
545-554 (1995); S. LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD (W. W. Norton New
York1996).
6. American criminology is provincial. In Criminology, the flagship journal for the American Society of
Criminology, just 7.4% of articles published between 1990 and 1999 had "any kind of international/
comparative focus". See R. Barbaret, Global Competence and American Criminology: An Expatriate'sView, 26
CRIMINOLOGIST at 1, 3-5 (2001). For the same period, the Australia and New Zealand Journal of Criminology
published 190 articles, of which 11% were international or comparative, by our standards still a low figure even
if it is 50% higher than the parallel American figure. American law and society scholarship is also provincial.
Between 1966 and 2000, for example, Law & Society Review published 352 "original research" articles, of
which only 23 (6.5% ) can be called "comparative analysis". See S. Silbey, From the Editor, 34 LAW &

SOCIETY REVIEW at 859-871 (2000). The analogous figure for 1990-2000 was 6.6%.
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values of comparative methods in the United States. The less natural a
comparative perspective seems in the study of social behavior, the greater the
chances that errors are made and opportunities for understanding are missed
because of its absence. Similarly, the more students of a system assume its own
uniqueness, the easier it will be to avoid evidence of non-uniqueness and the
harder it will be to identify differences that are dysfunctional and problematic.
The assumption of uniqueness thus frequently defeats opportunities to study how
American behavior and institutions are exceptional.
This preliminary essay explores the value of a comparative perspective in
thinking about corruption as a distinct and widely present type of behavior that is
criminal in a wide variety of complex societies. We first define that term and
illustrate the distinctiveness of the category of behavior and the importance of the
phenomenon as an impediment to economic development and social justice. We
then apply the perspective obtained from a comparative approach to an analysis
of white-collar crime as the criminal misuse of social or economic power.
II. DEFINING CORRUPTION
Rather than constructing a definition of the crime of corruption in isolation,
we wish to seek a definition of this particular offense in the context of the other
types of methods of obtaining property that are usually considered criminal. By
situating a definition of corruption in this larger tapestry, we hope to keep the
distinctions between types of crime clear and to maintain consistent criteria for
what makes violations of the interests of persons or institutions criminal.
In the criminal law there are at least four different methods of wrongfully
obtaining control over the property or personal interests of others. One recurrent
threat is the thief or burglar who takes by stealth, removing property when
owners and custodians are not looking. A second method of victimization is to
obtain property or compliance by use or threat of unauthorized personal force.
"Your money or your life," is the choice the robber seeks to impose on his victim
without any legal authority to use force. A third class of criminal methods
involves the use of fraud or falsity to induce victims to part with things of value
because they believe facts the offender has misrepresented to them. Frauds and
confidence games are as old as recorded history but as contemporary as the
hundreds of millions of emails sent out by persons purporting to have access to
Nigerian bank millions, but who require the assistance of "honest citizens" to
secure mutual riches.
The fourth method of obtaining control over the property or person of
another is the use of social or institutional power. When power granted to persons
for restricted purposes is used instead for unauthorized personal aims, unlawful
7. Assumptions of singularity that have been tested-such as the views that America is a "high crime
society" or that American criminal justice is uniquely characterized by "leaky pipe" caseload attrition-often
prove to be false.

Global Business & Development Law Journal/ Vol. 20
and socially wasteful exchanges take place: the government official charged with
selecting the most qualified firm to provide trash collection to the city instead
selects the firm that offers him the most money in a personal bribe or as a
"contribution" to a non-governmental organization; the school teacher with the
power to assign grades on a merit basis to student work instead trades high
grades for cash or personal favors from students or their families; the company
official with the power to sell property for the benefit of the firm gives a major
price concession to a buyer in exchange for a personal payment; the president of
a nation grants public licenses that are not supposed to be given away to his
friends and family rather than auctioning them off and making the proceeds
available to the common good. In all these cases, the offender has power for
limited purposes and uses the power in prohibited ways.
While acts of corruption, which we define as the illegal use of power for
personal gain, are no less or more dishonest than crimes involving force or
stealth, the social structure of corruption and its distribution in society are
different from crimes of personal force, fraud, or stealth. Anonymous acts of
force or secret-taking are typically acts of persons who lack social or government
power. In contrast, corruption is, by definition, an act of a person who has either
the economic power to bribe another or the power to provide a favor for a bribe.
Thus, corruption is a crime of the powerful, even though the power that triggers
corrupt acts may often be minor and special-purpose. Traffic cops, sixth-grade
teachers, and those who audit the tax records of small businesses are by no means
potentates, but they do hold special-purpose authority of great importance.
A.

Bribery and Corruption

What makes a bribe into a crime rather than a legitimate exchange of money
for value or a gift? The answer to this question has been another source of
uncertainty and complexity in penal theory.8 We define a bribe as the payment
for a corrupt act, making the wrongfulness of the payment depend on the
forbidden nature of the consideration for the payment. As long as the favor
provided should not be exchanged for money, the act is corrupt and the payment
for it should be considered a bribe. There may exist in local law specific
prohibitions on selling discretionary power where the only unlawful use of the
power is the acceptance of money itself. This type of "per se" corruption rule
might seem to challenge the derivative nature of our definition, but we do not
think the fact that it is the offering of money that makes the use of power
wrongful undermines the utility of our definitional approach. Even here, it is the
power holder's deviation from legal regulations constraining his acts that makes
the transfer of money or other favors in exchange for benefits into a forbidden
act.

8.

See J.T. NOONAN JR., BRIBES (Macmillan 1984).
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B.

Two DefinitionalIssues

Once the distinguishing feature of corruption is seen as the abuse of power,
the next important question concerns the breadth of abuses of power to be
regarded as corrupt. One definition would restrict the concept's scope to the
unlawful use of power for personal gain or other personal objectives, thus
limiting corruption to the venal and self-serving acts, which are the archetypical
illustrations of graft and bribery. In settings such as the break-in of psychiatrist
Daniel Ellsberg's office during the Nixon years, when national security powers
were misused for a conception of governmental interest, or in the Iran-Contra
case, where illegal exchanges were made to advance the government's political
interests without personal gain, a definition of corruption that requires personal
benefit would exclude such acts from being considered corrupt, while a definition
of corruption that spanned the unlawful use of power for all purposes would
clearly include such acts. The question-on the scope of the abuses of power that
should be called corrupt-is a close one. Our position is that the element of
personal gain should probably be required, but would include more in the
concept of personal gain than money or tangible property.
A second question is easier to resolve: Should unintended abuses of power be
considered corrupt? A totally objective standard of when power is unauthorized
seems an unjust and therefore unnecessary element of the definition of criminal
corruption. Where honest mistakes can be made about the scope of authorized
power, such errors should not be regarded as criminal, and, therefore, should not
be considered corrupt. Mistakes of this sort might well produce civil liability, but
they are not properly blameworthy in the criminal law and should not be
regarded as crimes. In our view, the proper mens rea for corrupt abuse of power
should be the Model Penal Code's notion of recklessness, and the criminological
category of corrupt behavior should also be restricted to purposely unlawful uses
of power. 9
The usefulness of our definition of corruption can best be explored by
comparing it with its competitors. Although the last decade of the 20th century
witnessed more publications on corruption than any previous period, key
conceptual and definitional questions remain "largely ignored".' On the one
hand, corruption is such a deeply contested concept that a coherent theory of it
"has never been fully articulated"." On the other hand, "there is considerable
overlap between various components of proposed definitions".' 2 All analysts
agree that corruption involves a deviation from certain standards of behavior. The
key question, therefore, and the pivot around which conflict revolves, is what

9. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE (American Law Institute 2003).
10. A. HEIDENHEIMER AND M. JOHNSTON, eds., POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS AND
xiii (2002).
11. See id. at 5.
12. See id at 13.

CONTEXTS,

Global Business & Development Law Journal/ Vol. 20
criteria to use in establishing those standards. There seem to be three main
candidates: law, public interest, and public opinion. 3
The legal approach defines corruption in terms of the criteria established by
official statutes and judicial interpretation. Thus, an act is corrupt if it is
prohibited by laws, and if it is not prohibited it is not corrupt, even if it is
unethical or abusive.
The public interest approach focuses on the effects of an act rather than on its
legal status. Under this view, if an act is harmful to the public interest, it is
corrupt even if it is legal. Conversely, if an act benefits the public, it is not
corrupt even if it violates the law.
Public opinion is the third source of criteria that has been used to define
standards of integrity. This approach posits that an act is corrupt if some public
defines it as such. Since public opinion may vary, analysts in this school must4
attend to the differences between "black," "grey," and "white" corruption.'
"Black corruption" exists when a majority of both elite and mass opinion
condemn it and want to see it punished. In contrast, "grey corruption" indicates
that some observers, usually elites, want to see the action punished, while others
do not-and the majority may be ambivalent. "White corruption" is corruption
that is tolerated by the majority of both elite and mass opinion; neither want to
see the conduct punished.
Entering the contest to define corruption requires assessing the usefulness of
these competing definitions. Because variations in definition affect research and
law enforcement-not to mention democracy and development-we believe that
definitional questions should be decided based upon criteria of utility. In our
view, law provides the most useful standard in terms of how corruption should be
defined.
C. The Need for a Legal Standard
Only a legal standard can provide a definition of corruption that qualifies
both analytically and morally as a crime, and thus allows us to compare offenses
of corruption with those of stealth, fraud, or force. Reserving the label of
corruption only for acts that appear to the observer to have resulted in substantial
social harm is both too broad and too restrictive. If any failed economic policy is
harmful to the public, are all those policies that produce more harm than good to
be judged, after the fact, as corrupt? Calling lawful acts corrupt when there is no
intent to do harm is senseless. Conversely, a harm-centered definition is also too
narrow because why should graft and self-dealing that doesn't produce any
obvious victims be exempted from blameworthiness?

13. See J. SCOTT, COMPARATIVE POLITICAL CORRUPTION (1972); and J. Gardiner, Defining Corruption,
in A. HEIDENHEIMER AND M. JOHNSTON, eds., POLITICAL CORRUPTION: CONCEPTS AND CONTEXTS 25-40
(2002).
14. See HEIDENHEIMER AND JOHNSTON, supro note 10.
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D. Necessary Versus Sufficient Conditions
Similarly, while a standard based on public opinion rather than legality
provides some notice of wrongfulness if public opinion is stable, it provides no
social protection in those environments where illegal self-dealing is most
rampant because it is tolerated by local mores-even though the behavior is
unlawful.
There turns out to be no principled argument against making the unlawful
use of power into a necessary element of the concept of corruption. Thus, no use
of power may be simultaneously authorized by law and called corrupt. In
adhering to this as an ironclad requirement there is the loss only of "corrupt" as
an adjective of derision for condemning some forms of undesirable behavior.
Given the many other negative terms available in modern languages for
denouncing bad policies, this appears to us to be no great loss.
Still, should all unlawful uses of power be regarded as corruption? We have
already excluded accidental illegality from the scope of our concern. Should
there also be some de minimis exemption for acts that are not obviously harmful?
We think not, because of the consequences that one faces if the sine qua non
requirement of corruption is either a violation of "public interest" or the presence
of critical "public opinion." If the behavior was unlawful, why need we prove
that this led to bad results any more with bribery than with larceny by stealth or
deception? Even worse would be requiring that corrupt acts be condemned by
public opinion other than merely by law, for this would have the effect of
minimizing the rate of formal corruption in precisely those settings where the
unlawful use of power is the greatest problem.
Rather than making ill repute or bad outcome a requirement of the actus reas
of corruption, the law can provide two affirmative defense-style exclusions to the
solely legal definition of corruption (in addition to the defense described earlier:
the lack of intent to violate the law). The first would exclude from corruption acts
where the actor's deviation from legal standard was objectively trivial. The
second would provide an exclusion when the illegal use of power was justified
by the greater harm avoided or the greater good achieved in a particular case.
This second exception would be narrow and rarely successful-as in the
exclusion from the category of corruption of illegal conduct by immigration
officials to avoid Nazi internment policies. It would not become a standing
invitation for political figures to justify broad programs of law violation."
Becausethe opportunity to be involved in corruption is positively associated
with increased power, corruption is one category of crime where the strong will
prey on the weak and where the net effect of many acts of corruption may be
regressive rather than redistributive of income. In many, if not most, settings

15. See, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (American Law Institute 2003),
discussing the theme of the defense of necessity.
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where corruption flourishes, the offense pattern produces greater rather than
lesser concentrations of wealth among advantaged populations.
E. Victimless Crime?
Because corruption frequently involves an exchange where the immediate
parties to a transaction all gain from the unauthorized use of power, many corrupt
acts lack a self-defined victim willing to report the conduct to law enforcement
authorities. This fact distinguishes corruption from crimes such as larceny,
burglary, or robbery in which there are often angry victims. Further, since it is
only the unauthorized use of power or its benefits that is regarded as wrongful,
the criminal law of corruption is highly sensitive to legal and cultural factors that
distinguish authorized from unauthorized motives and effects of discretionary
choices by persons in authority. Although a particular state may have a few
cultural or legal rules that vary the normal boundaries between illegal and lawful
force or claim of right to property, questions of local law and custom will far
more frequently be important in dividing permitted from prohibited uses of
power in cases of alleged corruption. In short, local variations in law and culture
will often be important in deciding whether conduct is corrupt.
Local customs and mores may also fail to condemn some acts of corruption
because an obviously harmed individual victim is not present. Thus, even when
local law makes the criminality of conduct clear, local morals may all but excuse
it.

Although the settings and practitioners of corruption will vary widely-from
petty officials to presidents, and from trivial material advantage to treason-there
are also systemic differences between corruption and other forms of crime.
Practitioners of corruption have power or money or both, and are thus more
likely to be of high or middle status than most of the burglars or robbers
identified in modern states. The combination of higher status offenders and the
frequent lack of a direct victim to complain makes acts of corruption much
harder to detect and prosecute than crimes with complainants.
F. Varieties of Corruption
As we define it, the essential element of corruption is the abuse of power, yet
there are a wide variety of forms of corrupt behavior that ought to be
distinguished. One distinction relates to the types of power abused-public or
governmental power versus private power.. The violation of public standards.
usually threatens the government or the collective benefit of its public as the
interest diminished by corrupt acts. In contrast, private corruption involves the
abuse of power by those given power over private interests, who advance their
own interests at the expense of the owner's interests. Accepting a bribe to avoid
collecting a tax is an uncomplicated case of public corruption. An agent who sells
private property to a friend for less than the market price is a case of corruption
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with a private victim.
A second important distinction is between predatory and cooperative
offenders. Specifically, the predatory offenders seek to keep, rather than share
with those they solicit, all of the gains from an unauthorized transaction, whereas
the cooperative offenders try to create a natural alliance with those who need the
benefits of the power they possess by creating a better outcome for them as well
as for the primary offender. The cooperative pattern produces a more stable
relationship that is harder to discover and stop. It is associated with social
popularity and not infrequently with political power. The predatory pattern does
not produce stable long-term relationships unless its victims and customers fear
the power-holders. Moreover, the predatory pattern of corruption may often be
mixed with uses of force as well. Where there is such a mixture, the charges
exacted by the unauthorized users of power may exceed the costs of services in
non-corrupt settings.
One final distinction in modes of corruption is between instrumental and
affective motivations for participation in corrupt uses of power. In instrumental
settings, one type of power is exchanged for other types, typically an exchange of
favors for money. What the power-holder wants with the money is not obvious in
the exchange. By contrast, in an affective misuse of power, the primary motive of
the authority is often that the benefit be conferred on a family member, loved
one, or some other person whose gain is the primary motive of the power-holder.
On some occasions, power may be misused simply to assert the offender's ability
to do so. While the misuse of power for affective purposes may be a violation of
social norms, loyalty to family or friends may itself be a socially approved value.
Thus, a decision that must sacrifice either standards of probity
in using power or
6
loyalty to friends or family can generate value conflicts.1
III.

SOME COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

A. Tale of Two Potentates
Joseph Mobuto, the late and unlamented president of a nation he chose to call
Zaire, and King Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia were two of the richest
and most free-spending figures in the ostentatious last decades of the 20th
century. Both were notorious for throwing money at projects with no apparent
social purpose in a world full of hunger and poverty. King Fahd built a replica of
the White House in the hills outside Marbella on the Costa del Sol in Spain.
President Mobuto spread billions of dollars over European capitals and Swiss

16. A fourth distinction, between bribery and extortion, has an extensive academic pedigree, but it
seems less conceptually and practically important than the distinctions we make here. Our distinction between
predatory and cooperative corruption is not parallel to the boundary between extortion and bribery, because
often those who extort may leave their victims with material advantages from the transaction. This certainly
happens in corrupt labor relations.
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banks, with personal zoos and palaces as prominent landmarks in a country
where starvation was not unknown.' 7 From a modern Western perspective, the
behavior of both these fin de sikcle"8 potentates was silly and immoral. But only
one of the two was corrupt in the technical sense.
King Fahd was wasteful, stupid, and unempathetic with the several billions
of petro-dollars that came under the control of the royal family of Saudi Arabia.
But evidently the money he wasted was meant to be under Saudi law wholly
under the control and personal dominance of the king. President-for-life Mobuto
came to be known as "the man who stole a country" because of his conversion of
public funds to private purposes: the extortion of bribes and the sale of publicly
owned assets for private advantage were violations of the law of the nation he
plundered. Mobuto was a criminal, while Fahd was merely a fool. In this sense,
the definition of corruption that we favor depends on principles of local
substantive law.
In one sense, this dependence on local principles might make the presence or
absence of a corruption label morally trivial. Would Mobuto have been any less
monstrous if a duly elected parliament had passed legislation declaring all
income from mineral rights to be the personal property of Joseph Mobuto? When
it is a violation of legal standards that transforms the use of power into a category
of criminal behavior, many varieties of despotic behavior are properly regarded
as non-criminal because those who fully dominate the institutions of government
may be in the position to manipulate legal principles to avoid the label of
corruption. In the vast majority of potential corruption situations, however, no
such power to avoid legal conclusions will be present. And even most cases
where the central government's leadership is involved in plunder, the legal
standards by which the behavior can be classified as illegal have been left intact.
To require that the use of power be unlawful as a matter of the law of the
place where the behavior occurs is to provide a neutral standard that can be used
to separate corrupt behavior from permissible discretionary acts. Relying instead
on non-local norms for judging the appropriateness of particular discretionary
acts is difficult to justify on a principled basis. Indeed, the best comparative
history of bribery defines the core concept as "an inducement improperly
influencing the administration of a duty meant to be gratuitously exercised". 9
Although the author of this definition displays some generalizing impulses (as
when he asserts that bribery is everywhere shameful), as a conceptual matter, the
meanings of the key terms in the definition-inducement, improperly, duty, and
so on-cannot be discerned independent of the law and norms of a particular
place. Thus, even if bribery is everywhere shameful and secretive, what counts as
bribery is locally defined.

17.

TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 2004 (Pluto Books 2004).

18.
19.

End of the Century.
See NOONAN, supra note 8.
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Complexity and Corruption

What are the conditions of social structure and social value that influence the
rate and the varieties of corrupt behavior in a particular place? The comparative
perspective might be a useful tool for addressing this kind of question, but care
must be taken to specify the salient sub-questions. There is, for example, an
important distinction between the conditions that increase the opportunities for
corrupt acts and social features, which actually increase the rate of corrupt
behavior. A major influence on the number and variety of potential cases of
corruption is social and political complexity, with the number of opportunities for
corrupt uses of power increasing as a function of the amount of power distributed
throughout a social and political system and the complexity of restraints placed
on the exercise of power in that system. The more complex an economic system,
the greater the number of occasions when people will make important decisions
that affect the property and interests of others. There are not only more different
types of power in complex arrangements, there is a much greater tendency for the
exercise of power to be constrained by the specialized roles of the people with
access to it. When people put their savings under their mattresses, the primary
custodians of the property are also its owners. In a society with banks, there are
bank tellers and vice-presidents with power over the money of others, which is
constrained by legal conditions. The opportunity to abuse power arises with the
combination of physical control and legally limited power. The greater the
complexity in a system, the larger the number of relationships of authorities with
constrained power: toll takers, bank tellers, customs inspectors, tax auditors,
mayors, and head waiters. In this sense, complexity in social and material
relations is the mother of corruption.
The King Fahd example reminds us, however, that it is not merely the
amount of property or power that determines the potential for corruption-it is
also the constraints on its use. An absolute monarch cannot, by our definition, be
a corrupt actor because there are no normative limits on his exercise of power. In
the sense in which we use the term, it is not true that "absolute power corrupts
absolutely." Rather, "absolute power" removes the constraints on power that
make corruption possible when those constraints are not respected.
If opportunities for corruption expand with increases in complexity, do the
rates of corruption also expand with an increase in the number of opportunities
for exercising unlawful power? We suspect that a survey of developed and nondeveloped nations in the world at the turn of the 21st century would reveal little
evidence of a positive correlation between complexity and corruption. If
anything, poor and simple societies tend to be more corrupt than rich and
complex ones. In fact, when viewed from an external perspective, comparative
judgments about corruption that business rating groups publish suggest that
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visible corruption is more often associated with more primitive levels of
economic and political development. Conversely, complexity is associated with
lower levels of corruption.' Of course, there are many less-open societies in
which limited capacity for investigation and communication causes even rampant
corruption to go unmentioned in public media. However, that is not why
complexity does not breed corruption; rather, most closed societies are not
economically advanced.
There are at least three reasons why the rate of corruption does not grow as a
function of the number of the opportunities for it to occur. First, many of the
same technical processes that encourage the growth of complexity can be used to
monitor the exercise of discretionary power and, thus, control corruption through
direct observation and deterrence. Hence, accountability can also grow with
complexity.
Second, increased complexity does not inevitably increase corruption
because people learn social roles that impose an obligation of constraint. A
culture of conformity with social roles of limited power is one important aspect
of socialization in many complex modem societies. Being a responsible bank
teller is learned behavior, and those who are socialized into roles with limitations
on power will learn to respect and internalize the relevant rules of restraint. The
material rewards for observing rules of restraint can be substantial, so can
punishments for dereliction of duty. The incentives to conform are therefore
great. In some less-developed societies, by contrast, less effort may have been
expended trying to socialize people to internalize a commitment to restraint in the
performance of their public roles, and fewer rewards are given those actors who
do try to act with integrity.
There is a third reason why visible corruption might decrease in more
complex societies-the evolution of forms of corruption into less visible
behaviors to avoid the deterrents and preventions that grow with complexity.
More complicated societies not only generate lower rates of corruption, but a
smaller proportion of the corruption that is present in such systems will be visible
and easily measured. Crude and visible forms of corruption disappear more
quickly than subtle and hidden abuses. This is a form of natural selection that
accompanies increased complexity. Thus, there is good reason to suppose that the
"dark figure" of corruption will encompass a larger proportion of corrupt acts in
complex and developed societies than in less-developed nations. As a result, the
lower visibility of corruption in more complex societies is not just evidence of
less crime, it also reflects the adaptive tendency to hide higher status offending in
developed nations.
While cross-sectional comparisons of the variations between nations in the
amount and variety of corrupt behavior are ambiguous evidence of causation,
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longitudinal analysis of the development of particular countries might better
reveal patterns that would help to answer the following questions: Is there a
recurrent pattern of change in the levels and types of corruption associated with
various stages of economic or political development-a single "natural history"
in which particular stages of development are associated with particular patterns
of corruption? Or are there different evolutionary patterns associated with
different cultural values that interact with stages of economic and political
development? Are there some cultural conditions that retard the growth or
accelerate the decline in levels of corruption, while other value patterns provoke
it? If there are, what are these values and what are the magnitudes of their
effects? And are there circumstances in which levels and types of corruption tend
to be stable over long periods of time despite changes in other aspects of
government and economy?
Similarly, how important is corruption to total economic activity and to the
functions and responsiveness of the political system at different times and stages
of development? If levels of corruption are much greater in some systems than in
others of comparable economic development, how important are patterns of
corruption in explaining the different prospects for economic growth and for the
distribution of income? In particular, is corruption on the whole a regressive
influence on income distribution, and are other types of crime more likely to
reduce income inequality? If so, at what cost to economic growth?
Some features of social and economic development provide increased
opportunities for many types of crime. Larger cities with efficient transportation
systems encourage offenses of both stealth and force by creating the opportunity
to come and go without fear of identification and detection. The same features of
development facilitate fraud by enabling false identities to be assumed and
dropped as people come and go.
If there are generalizations to be made about the criminological impact of
increased complexity on corruption, we suspect that both trickery and corruption
will be more prominent types of offending in wealthier and more complex social
settings. This does not mean that rates of criminality of these types will actually
increase as a number per thousand citizens or as a percentage of total economic
activity, but rather that the proportion of all crime that is committed by fraud and
corruption will go up with levels of social complexity and material wealth.
C. Complexity and Types of Corruption
Analysts of corruption in Western history argue that one corollary of the
illegal nature of bribes is a universal penchant for secrecy.2 However, many
patterns of governmental and political corruption are best classified as "open
secrets." Indeed, strong circumstantial evidence of political favor-trading and
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dynastic favoritism to the family members of those in political power were all but
acknowledged in regimes such as the Suharto government in Indonesia and the
Marcos government in the Philippines,23 as well as among the government
officials engaged in narcotics trafficking in places such as Mexico and Panama.
The lack of a frightening deterrent should not motivate openness as long as
visibility increases to some extent the risk of apprehension. To explain open
corruption we need, instead, to search for positive utilities-benefits of
openness-that reveal why even small risks may be thought worth taking.
Perhaps the phenomenon of the "open secret" is simply evidence of
inefficient or inept criminality, so that the notoriety of corrupt behavior is a
manifestation of the parties to the corruption failing to keep their shameful
secrets hidden. But there are at least two other explanations of notorious
corruption. The first is the "learning curve" notion mentioned previously. To the
extent that there is real novelty in the restrictions on power that get imposed with
governmental and economic complexity, relatively open patterns of corruption
may take place because those who hold power use it without regard to relatively
novel restrictions. President Mobuto-at some level-may have thought himself
just as unconstrained in his personal use of his nation's treasure as did King Fahd
with his obscene royal allowance. Under these circumstances, the open abuse of
power might be a developmental stage that is quickly replaced by more cautious
and prudent behavior as examples of the punishment and disgrace of the
improprieties accumulated.
The problem with this "learning curve" explanation in the age of the jet-set is
that so many intelligent and sophisticated people still seem prone to let
favoritism, the conversion of vast sums of governmental resources, and the use of
public power for personal gain become public knowledge. It is almost as if there
were some benefit to corrupt behaviors being well known.
And there might be. Just as corruption is at its core a use of power, the
visibility of corruption can be an advertisement of the corrupt actor's power.
Favoring one's relatives and spending vast sums that can only have come from a
public treasury are evidence of the great powers possessed by the actor. That
public knowledge of the wrongful act may be a risk worth taking where it
demonstrates the magnitude of the offender's power.
This instrumental and expressive value of "showing off' may be particularly
pronounced when the corrupt act serves other favored social values such as
helping the poor,24 being good to one's family,25 or serving the national honor.
One final motive for open corruption is as a way of asserting that the actor's
power is not limited after all. The publicly corrupt act becomes a way of
asserting its own legality. The openly corrupt activities may serve the offender as
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evidence that his behavior is not really wrong. Certainly this is the dictator's
usual defense when well-known abuses of power are the basis for later charges.
Where this applies, it is a complete explanation for the utility of openness in the
unlawful use of power for the offender, for it is only in the open defiance of a
legal standard that the claim of rightfulness and therefore the validation of
unconstrained power can be asserted.
D. Corruptionand Other Crimes
It might also be useful in conducting comparative analyses over time or
cross-sectionally to inquire about the relationship between rates of corruption and
rates of other types of criminal offenses. The relationship between rates of
various types of offenses over time and across different types of society has not
been a major topic in theoretical or empirical criminology. The general
assumption has been that environments with high rates of some types of criminal
offenses would also have high rates of other varieties, but this type of analysis
has usually been confined to various classes of crimes of stealth and force.26 The
assumption is that many of the environmental features that provoke or repress
one kind of offense will have the same kind of effect on other kinds as well.
There is also, of course, the notion that periods and places with large numbers of
persons willing to commit crimes will have high rates of all sorts of offenses. If
the proximate cause of high crime rates is a large number of potential offenders,
then the general level of all types of crime should reflect the level of potential
offenders.
Once the relation between types of crime considers both corruption and
crimes of stealth and force, assumptions about rates are complicated by the
different distribution of criminal opportunities that exist for crimes of corruption.
Corruption is an offense that requires power---either political or economic-for
the meaningful opportunity to gain from its criminal use. Thus, not all of those
who can employ force, stealth, or fraud for criminal purposes can resort to
corruption. To the extent that crimes of force and stealth are concentrated in the
least powerful elements of a society, there may be very little overlap between the
most likely common criminals and those persons with the best opportunities to
profit from corruption. Does this mean that there should be no significant
relationship between rates of common offenses and rates of corruption? Probably
not.
Even if particular offenders can not or do not commit both types of offenses,
the environmental conditions that foster or discourage common and corruption
offenses might still generate systematic relationships between corrupt and
common crimes. If the populations of potential offenders are distinct, there
should be no substitution between common and corrupt offenses. But if there are
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environmental conditions, such as high or low tolerance of dishonesty, or levels
of effort or efficiency in detection and prosecution of offenses, that have a
common influence on different types of crime, then one would expect rates of
non-corruption and corruption offenses to rise and fall together.
There may also be social conditions that favor some forms of criminality and
disfavor others. In Asia, for instance, Japan exhibits middling levels of many
types of corruption offenses, but has extremely low rates of crimes of force and
stealth." Conversely, Thailand has higher levels of both lethal violence and
corruption,28 while Singapore has more lethal violence but substantially less
corruption. In Europe, Italy has high levels of corruption and high homicide rates
(at least by European standards), while the United Kingdom has lower rates of
both corruption and homicide. And in the United States, Louisiana has high
levels of corruption and lethal violence, while Hawaii has high levels of
corruption, but low levels of violence. 29 As these examples illustrate, different
types of crime often move independently of one another. The comparative study
of crime and corruption may help to identify patterns within that variation.
IV. CORRUPTION AND THE PROBLEMATICS OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIME

The extraordinary history of the study of "white-collar crime" can inform the
analysis of corruption in two respects. First, it provides a cautionary tale of how
problems of definition and classification can promote confusion and inhibit
research. Second, some of the important themes that characterize writing about
white-collar crime turn out to be at the core of corruption as a crime type as well.
Students of corruption can learn from the definitional problems of the whitecollar category at the same time that the focus on the abuse of power in
corruption can teach important lessons about one subcategory of white-collar
crime with distinctive characteristics.
Stanton Wheeler30 began his analysis of definitional issues in white-collar
crime by quoting E. A. Ross's comment about the perfidy of "the man who picks
pockets with a railway rebate, murders with an adulterant instead of a bludgeon,
burgles with a 'rake off' instead of a jimmy, cheats with a company prospectus
instead of a deck of cards". 3' The problem with this rhetorical assemblage of the
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sins of the powerful is the lack of analytic precision in identifying the agency of
criminal harm. How, for example, does one "pick pockets with a railway rebate"?
Such metaphors are both a wonderful tool for condemning conduct and a step
away from rigor in defining the wrongfulness and the criminal agency that
characterize the offending.
The first formal attempt to define white-collar crime was provided by Edwin
H. Sutherland, the author of the concept. According to Sutherland, "White-collar
crime may be defined approximately as a crime committed by a person of
respectability and high social status in the course of his occupation." But why is
the social status of the offender important? If it was to demonstrate that crime is
not solely the product of poverty, then why was the job-related aspect also
deemed important? And if there were supposed to be any distinctive elements
attached to the job-related aspect of this definition of white-collar crime, what
were they?
Moreover, Professor Wheeler says that Sutherland's definition and his
empirical focus diverged from the start:
His book was devoted, however, to the crimes of organizations not of
persons.., thus a firm basis for ambiguity had been laid. Those
following Sutherland sometimes focused on persons of high status,
sometime on occupation, and sometimes on corporate bodies.
The "crimes" that Sutherland counted included both violations of regulatory
standards and civil contract cases. Although organizational offenses are an
important criminological category,32 they are only one part of the white collar
category in all of the usual definitions. For this and other reasons, Wheeler
claimed in 1983 that "the concept of white-collar crime is in a state of disarray". 33
Nothing in subsequent analysis has clarified the core conception.
There are important parallels in the definitional problems found in the whitecollar and corruption categories. First, the symbolic or adjectival character of
some definitions of both terms has generated conceptual confusion. Just as the
need to stigmatize the corrupt official or influence peddler has blurred
definitional boundaries in corruption, so does the metaphor of "picking pockets
with a railway rebate" in white-collar crime owe none of its rhetorical power to
precision. Denunciations of white-collar crime "reflect a concern for the
weakening of the social fabric created when people in privileged positions
destroy trust by committing crimes". 34 Although the same language can be used
to describe popular disgust with corruption, the cost of such broad rhetorical
sweeps has been substantial. Most importantly, the loose and denunciatory usage
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of both of these terms hampers the search for conceptual clarity and analytical
utility.
In fact, we go even further to suggest that one reason for special public
concern with white-collar crime can be found in the technical conception of
corruption that we urge-the abuse of power. Whether combined with fraud or
merely concealed, the essence of corruption is the misuse of power (and this is
also what Professor Wheeler would regard as the misuse of privilege). In some
settings, the misuse of power is manifest as classic organizational offenses, while
in other settings, organizations are the primary victims of corrupt offenses by
individuals or groups. In either case, it is not merely a crime by a powerful
person that invites special condemnation; it is the criminal misuse of power.
The parallels between white-collar crime and corruption provide another
context in which to reconsider the question of whether personal gain should be a
definitional requirement of criminal corruption. In the annals of white-collar
crime, when combinations to retrain prices, for example, are discovered, there is
no reason to worry about whether those who fix prices were only operating for
the benefit of the corporations they represented or whether they personally would
gain from the artificially high prices. Certainly, the General Electric heavy
equipment conspiracies would have been just as socially injurious if its only
beneficiaries had been the corporation. So why require personal gain as an
element of the definition?
It is no answer to this that personal advantage can always be found through
creative contortions in cases where organizations will benefit from restraint of
trade. The essence of the anti-social nature of price-fixing depends in no obvious
way on whether the corporate conspirators obtained raises or stock options. If the
corrupt bank teller or government official passed all her material gains to favored
friends, how would that diminish the corruption?
Our focus on the misuse of power in both corruption and white-collar crime
may also help to distinguish degrees of wrong in notorious behavior by public
officials. The mayor of Washington, D.C., Marion Barry, was caught ingesting
crack cocaine (after the standard set of public denials). Barry's drug dependency
certainly compromised his ability to serve as a public official, but the degree of
public blame in this case was sufficiently tempered so that, even after his drug
treatment, Barry was deemed a credible candidate in the next election. When he
was president, Bill Clinton had a sexual relationship with an intern and lied about
it. What may separate these offenses from the Watergate scandal and the Daniel
Ellsberg burglary case is the distinction between crimes involving powerful
people and the criminal misuse of power. It is not merely the misbehavior of
those with power that generates special condemnation; it is when power becomes
the instrument of criminality that deeds are deemed most blameworthy. This,
more than class resentment, may explain the angry response to the symbolism of
some forms of white-collar crime and corruption. What is distinctively modern
and threatening in the criminal use of power are the modern innovations and
mechanisms that are utilized to achieve criminal ends. Whether this is a part of
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crimes against organizations or of crimes on behalf of organizations, it turns the
tools of modernity against the public welfare and elicits especially intense
disapprobation.
V. CONCLUSION

The central principle of this article is that corruption is the criminal misuse of
power. This feature of corruption as a crime suggests that it is an offense that will
be committed more often than others by persons of higher social and economic
status (who hold the power that generates the potential for corruption). Because
the criminal misuse of social or political power can be viewed as an abuse of
trust, there is a reason to predict that corrupt offenders will be viewed as more
blameworthy than those who take by deception or stealth. This same tendency to
condemn the misuse of power may explain some of the passion in the
criminological discourse about white-collar crime.

